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MEASURING THE RULE OF LAW IN INDIA:
A VOLUNTEER LAWYER’S EXPERIENCE
Linda D. McGill*
When I set off for New Delhi, India in January 2003 to serve as a volunteer with
the International Senior Lawyers Project (ISLP),1 nation-building was not in my
mission statement. After all, India is the world’s largest democratic country, sustaining
that status for sixty years from its violent birth by partition through the curtailment of
individual freedoms in the 1975 “emergency”2 to its recent emergence as a “giant” of
economic development and intellectual capital.3 India’s hold on democracy is all the
more impressive given the religious and cultural differences among its vast population
and the legacy of still-simmering resentments from centuries of social and economic
stratification under the caste system.4 Except for cross-border tensions with Pakistan,
India has been at relative peace with itself and the world since its independence in
1947. It has a functioning and independent judicial system, free elections, civilian
police force, parliamentary government, and numerous robust political parties. The
Constitution of India, the longest of any in the world, is an admirable document. The
statutes and common law are comprehensive and based on well-accepted legal norms.
In short, and in contrast with its neighbors Myanmar, Sri Lanka, Pakistan, Nepal, and
China, India has built a democratic nation that has endured.
Rather than nation-building, the rule of law was the framework for my volunteer
service. Consistent with ISLP’s mission, I was volunteering in order to support and
advance the rule of law in India. My specific assignment was to provide “senior
lawyer” assistance to a group of public interest lawyers who handled human rights
cases on behalf of the poor. Given the facially healthy appearance of India’s
democratic institutions, I assumed that the rule of law issues embedded in that work
would be somewhat nuanced and subtle, well along a continuum of rights and
principles that had already been established. However, as I was to discover, many rule
of law principles in India are at a more nascent stage of development. It is true that
virtually all of the fundamental legal principles associated with a democratic system
of law are eloquently articulated in India’s Constitution, codes, and judicial opinions.
However, many of these laws—especially those affecting individual rights and
protections—are so unevenly and inadequately enforced that they effectively do not
exist for large segments of India’s population. The size of the gap between the law on
the books and its access by and application to all levels of a society is one crucial

* Shareholder, Bernstein, Shur, Sawyer & Nelson, P.A. Ms. McGill practices labor and employment
law in Bernstein, Shur’s Portland, Maine, office.
1. Founded in 2000, ISLP provides volunteer legal services by experienced attorneys with the goal of
advancing democracy and the rule of law, protecting human rights, and promoting equitable economic
development worldwide. See generally ISLP Home Page, http://www.islp.org.
2. Following a period of economic and political stability in India in the wake of the 1971 war with
Pakistan, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi imposed a state of emergency that included the imposition of press
censorship and the curtailment of other fundamental freedoms. The Emergency ended with the defeat of
Gandhi’s party in 1977. See SUNIL KHILNANI, THE IDEA OF INDIA 45-48 (Penguin Books 1999) (1997).
3. See generally ARVIND PANAGARIYA, INDIA: THE EMERGING GIANT (2008).
4. For an analysis of why democracy in India has prevailed and is likely to continue, see generally
KHILNANI, supra note 2.
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indicator of a country’s progress on the rule of law continuum. By that measure the
nation of India, while not outside intervention or fundamental restructuring, is still in
the building process.
My volunteer assignment was for a period of five months, the length of a semester
at the American Embassy School in New Delhi for my fourteen year-old daughter and
a sabbatical from my law firm for me. Even today, with the benefit of hindsight, I
would not be able to articulate an entirely logical rationale for the decision to trade our
comfortable, small-town lifestyle in Maine and my satisfying and busy practice,
however temporarily, for the considerable uncertainties of living and working in India.
For my daughter, the lure was the opportunity to live in another culture and have classmates from around the world. For me, the motivation was less certain. It is easier to
identify the decision point, which came shortly after I learned about ISLP and
discovered the potential for using years of legal experience in a very different setting
from my management-side employment practice at home.
In the fall of 2002—at the same time my daughter and I were beginning to discuss
the feasibility (or lack of it) of spending a few months together living out of the country
and musing on India as a place that interested us both—ISLP had been contacted by
the Human Rights Law Network (HRLN), a collective of lawyers and social activists
headquartered in New Delhi who provide pro bono legal representation and other
advocacy for those who have little or no access to the justice system in India.5 When
I found the ISLP site on the Internet and made a spur-of-the-moment application, I did
not know this. But from my first contact and interview with ISLP’s executive director,
the die seemed cast. HRLN needed a volunteer lawyer in India, and I was a lawyer
who wanted to do volunteer work in India. In surprisingly short order, I arranged a
leave of absence from my firm, transferred files to my partners, and obtained the airline
tickets and visas. On New Year’s Day we stumbled through customs and out into the
air of New Delhi, acrid with the warming fires of street dwellers and the exhaust of
thousands of vehicles, all apparently competing for a single traffic lane. After a few
days of rough adjustment, during which we nearly decided to return home without
unpacking, my daughter went off to school in an embassy bus and I took a rickshaw
to HRLN’s office to explore my new identity: volunteer lawyer and a handmaiden to
India’s rule of law.
HRLN, based in New Delhi, operates throughout India. It began in 1989 as a law
firm of three activist lawyers in Mumbai who represented the poor on a day-to-day
basis. Recognizing the need for impact litigation as the only way to effect real change,
the firm began identifying public interest issues, networking with like-minded lawyers
in other parts of the country, and joining with other advocacy groups under an inclusive
banner of human rights law. Today its staff of lawyers and activists handles a
staggering array of human rights and related issues on an impossibly small budget and
is recognized as a major force for law reform and access to justice throughout the
country.
At HRLN’s modest offices, I learned fairly quickly to function without the luxuries
of my small law firm, such as clients whose needs were readily apparent to me, an

5. For more on HRLN and their role in advancing human rights, see Human Rights Law Network,
Home Page, http://www.hrln.org.

2008]

MEASURING THE RULE OF LAW IN INDIA

539

assistant, research tools, dependable Internet access, workable telephone, and a
thermostat. Instead of an office, I used a corner of another lawyer’s desk, quickly
cleared for me as soon as I arrived and climbed the stairs to HRLN’s third floor
quarters. It helped that English was the language (though not necessarily the first one)
of most of my HRLN colleagues, as well as of the pleadings and proceedings in the
Delhi High Court and Supreme Court of India where HRLN’s senior advocates
practiced. But learning how to add value to HRLN’s work was more challenging.
Many of the issues that were the focus of HRLN’s advocacy—the continuing,
sometimes violent, oppression of Dalits (known better in the west as “untouchables”),
slave labor, child marriage, the clash between secular and religious law, dowry
crimes—had no obvious counterparts in United States jurisprudence, let alone in my
practice experience. Despite the excellent groundwork done by ISLP to prepare the
way for its first on-the-ground volunteer in India, I harbored doubts about whether my
years of experience in private practice in the United States could in fact be translated
into any kind of meaningful contribution to the work of HRLN. Fortunately, within a
relatively short time of my arrival at HRLN, and after many hours of sipping chai,
attending meetings, and being introduced as the “Senior Lawyer from America,” an
issue emerged on which I, and ISLP, could in fact be useful. Moreover, the issue was
a compelling one that portrayed graphically the gap between the facially enlightened
system of laws and justice in India and the darker side of failed application and
enforcement.
Colin Gonsalves, HRLN’s founder and executive director who has gained
international recognition for his work in human rights law,6 had agreed that HRLN
would take the appeal of Mohammed Afzal, a Muslim indigent who had been
convicted and sentenced to death for conspiring to bomb the Indian Parliament in
December 2001.7 The representation was a legal challenge: it was also a political and
social anathema. The attack on Parliament, which was ultimately unsuccessful,
involved five suicide bombers who drove a vehicle packed with explosives through the
gates of the Parliament building. The would-be attackers were killed by police just
inside the gates, but six members of the security forces and two innocent by-standers
died in the shoot-out. The incident was profoundly shocking to the nation, provoking
a tense stand-off with Pakistan based on the wide-spread belief that the Pakistani
government covertly supported the perpetrators.8 Afzal was a surrendered militant who
had trained at a terrorist camp in Pakistan, had “confessed” on national television to
an active role in the bomb plot, and had openly identified himself with a high profile
Kashmiri terrorist group.9 He was without resources. His three convicted coconspirators had secured prominent criminal lawyers for their appeals, but until HRLN
stepped into the breach, Afzal was alone on a one-way trip to the gallows, with most
of India glad for the ticket.

6. See Nora Boustany, India’s Pioneer of Public Interest Law, WASH. POST, Oct. 24, 2003, at A22.
7. See Rahul Bedi, Three to Die for Attack on Indian Parliament, DAILY TELEGRAPH (London), Dec.
19, 2002, at 12, available at http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/main.jhtml?xml=/news/2002/12/19/
wkash19.xml.
8. See Rajiv Chandrasekaran & Rama Lakshmi, New Delhi Lays Blame, WASH. POST, Dec. 29, 2001,
at A1.
9. Id.
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Whatever the “facts” of the alleged conspiracy, it was immediately apparent that
Afzal’s legal rights had been trampled. The investigation, collection, and handling of
evidence against him by the police and the State were cursory, even corrupt: his guilt
had apparently been presumed.10 The televised confession, which was shown
repeatedly all over the country before trial, had been arranged and perhaps scripted by
the police, in spite of India’s requirement that an accused is remanded to the protection
of a magistrate within twenty-four hours after arrest11 and that a magistrate must ensure
that any confession by the accused is voluntary.12 Afzal’s request for a senior counsel
experienced in capital cases was denied by the judge. The court-appointed counsel did
not meet with or prepare his client in any meaningful way, even though the prosecution
announced its drive for the death penalty before the trial began. During the trial,
counsel sometimes did not appear at all or did not stay for the whole proceeding, did
not cross-examine adverse witnesses, and seemed to agree with statements prejudicial
to Afzal made by the trial judge. The Prevention of Terrorism Act (POTA),13 which
had been passed (like the post-September 11 Patriot Act in the United States) as a
reaction to the Parliament incident and as a measure to control cross-border terrorism,
was used by the trial court to justify the death sentence even though there was no
evidence of actions by Afzal that fit the statutory definition of a “terrorist act” punishable by death.14 Moreover, POTA was in theory vulnerable to constitutional
challenges.15 The exclusive method of execution in capital cases in India was (and
remains) the barbaric means of hanging, a basis for attacking the death sentence in any
case. In short, Afzal’s case, regardless of its context of terrorism, posed the question
of whether fundamental rule of law principles such as the presumption of innocence,
due process, fair trial, and judicial impartiality would be enforced and applied in a
difficult case—or whether considerably rougher “justice” would be upheld and
condoned by the courts.
Besides its political unpopularity, the case posed additional problems for HRLN.
Capital cases are not standard fare for human rights lawyers, and HRLN’s resources
were already stretched over hundreds of other cases and causes. Moreover, although
nearly all the principles at stake were articulated in the Constitution of India or the
criminal code, there was no well-developed jurisprudence in India on many of these
points.
Fortunately, no criminal law background was required to recognize the glaring
failures of procedural and substantive law presented by the Afzal appeal. In contrast
with the relatively few on-point passages of dictum and general pronouncements in
Indian jurisprudence, United States and European law were obviously thick with

10. See Somini Sengupta, Death Sentence in Terror Attack Puts India on Trial, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 10,
2006, at A3, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2006/10/10/world/asia/10india.html.
11. INDIA CODE OF CRIM. PROC. § 57 (1973), available at http://mha.nic.in/acts-rules/ccp1973.pdf.
12. Id. § 164.
13. Prevention of Terrorism Act, 2002, No. 15 Acts of Parliament, 2002, available at
http://mha.nic.in/poto-02.htm.
14. Id. ch. II § 3(2)(a).
15. Although upheld as constitutional by the Supreme Court in 2003, POTA was repealed by the newly
elected government in 2004. Human Rights Watch, India: POTA Repeal a Step Forward for Human
Rights (2004), http://hrw.org/english/docs/2004/09/22/india9370.htm.
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decisions that provided a blueprint and direct citations for many of HRLN’s legal
positions. Working closely with ISLP’s office in New York, I reviewed as much of the
record as we could reconstruct, acquired grounding in Indian criminal law and
procedure, and prepared memoranda describing the case and identifying the points for
research. ISLP’s executive director then assembled a team of lawyers from leading
firms in Boston, Washington, New York, and London who located and digested
relevant opinions, provided legal analysis, and even drafted sections to be used in the
appellate brief.
It was satisfying to brainstorm with lawyers at HRLN to identify legal arguments
that we hoped would be considered seriously by the appellate court and then to see
those arguments developed through the joint efforts of lawyers in distant countries.
While I had the benefit and stimulation of being part of the action, the other ISLP
volunteers willingly gave their time and resources to assist human rights lawyers whom
they would likely never meet, in defense of an individual whose case and cause were
difficult and unpopular, even reviled. In our focus on the case at hand, none of us
mentioned the rule of law as an abstract principle. But our common commitment to
the bedrock issues involved was both the animating force and the bond among the
members of the legal team, no matter the differences in our practices and indeed our
lives.
The 250-page appellate brief was filed in March 2003. Oral arguments, which
play a more prominent part in appeals in India than in the United States, began in May
2003 and lasted for more than three weeks. In September 2003, Afzal’s conviction and
death sentence were upheld by the Delhi High Court; in August 2005, a two-judge
panel of the Supreme Court of India followed suit.16 Much of the evidence against
Afzal and other co-defendants was thrown out by the Supreme Court as shoddily
collected or even falsified, and defects in the trial were duly noted. However, Afzal’s
“confession” on television was held to be voluntary and, combined with the record of
calls to his mobile phone from the mobile phones of the dead attackers, was held to be
sufficiently incriminating to outweigh the procedural deficiencies.
Although Afzal was scheduled to be hanged in October 2006, he is still alive. The
arguments raised in the briefs failed to sway the appellate courts, but these same
arguments have now been taken up by media sources, human rights activists, and
advocates both within and outside of India.17 Through protests, demonstrations, and
petitions to the executive, there are ongoing calls for commutation of Afzal’s death
sentence and even for his release, based on the miscarriage of justice detailed in the
court record and briefs. In short, the rule of law issues made by HRLN and ISLP,
although discounted by the judiciary, have leapt from the courtroom to the street,
where they are recognized as too compelling and fundamental to be swept aside. At

16. Mohammed Afzal v. Nat’l Capital Territory of Delhi, Criminal Appeal No. 381 of 2004, 2005
SCCL.Com 461, available at http://www.judis.nic.in/supremecourt/qrydisp.aspx?filename=27092.
17. See, e.g., Hasan Suroor, Afzal Guru: British Rights Activists’ Plea to Kalam, THE HINDU, Apr. 25,
2007, available at http://www.hinduonnet.com/2007/04/25/stories/2007042501871500.htm (noting that
the European Parliament, as “a standard bearer for human rights,” has been pressured to raise Afzal’s case
with Indian President Kalam); Karan Thapar, Should Mohammad Afzal be Hanged?, HINDUSTAN TIMES,
Oct. 15, 2006, available at http://www.hindustantimes.com/storypage/storypage.aspx?id=a7a186c4-b30646a7-9ab5-cc0c7b257f8b.
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this date Afzal’s ultimate fate is unknown. Work on the Afzal case wound down in
April as the temperatures in New Delhi went up, reaching 110 degrees Fahrenheit on
most days. Although it was only early summer, there were already water shortages in
numerous neighborhoods, including ours. My next assignment involved the
devastating consequences of a different kind of water shortage and provided both a
distraction from the heat and another lens on life and law in India.
Beginning in the late 1990s, the heavily populated states of Rajasthan, Madhya
Pradesh, Uttar Pradesh, and Andhra Pradesh had experienced successive years of
sustained drought. As a result, tens of millions of people were chronically on or over
the brink of starvation, unable to feed themselves through their traditional subsistence
farming or to find marginal jobs that might allow them to buy an adequate food supply.
The famine conditions were compounded by a rash of suicides among farmers,
attributed by the human rights community to the psychological and spiritual depression
of crushing debt and the shame of failure.
In India, elaborate government-run food distribution programs exist on paper and
as line items in the federal and state budgets. In reality, a large percentage of these
food programs are inept, corrupt, or even fictitious.18 In 2001, using the law reform
vehicle of Public Interest Litigation (PIL),19 HRLN and other activist groups had
petitioned the Supreme Court of India to mandate that the government effectively
address the problem of rural starvation.20 The Court had responded by directing the
central and state governments to implement immediately and fully the food security
programs that already existed, under which grain was supposed to be provided to those
below the poverty line and others qualifying for ration cards; to provide mid-day meals
to primary students; and to give food support to destitute elderly, pregnant women, and
children up to the age of six. The Court also ordered that the governments properly
operate “work for food” programs aimed at paying villagers in drought-affected areas
in rupees or grain for work on water conservation or other small scale projects to make
village life more sustainable. As is typical with PILs, the Supreme Court retained
indefinite jurisdiction and held periodic hearings to monitor compliance and to direct
other relief as warranted.
By the spring of 2003, HRLN was receiving increasingly frequent and credible
reports from rural villages of people starving to death literally on the steps of locked
or empty government “go-downs” or grain storehouses. In mid-April, in preparation
for an upcoming right to food compliance hearing, I went with HRLN’s director and
a small group of other activists and advocates to the state of Andhra Pradesh to gather
facts and evidence on reported starvation deaths. We left from Hyderabad at dawn on

18. See PANAGARIYA, supra note 3, at 361 (noting that in 2000 only 3.7 percent of the national food
subsidy actually reached the intended population).
19. PIL is a device created and recognized by the Supreme Court of India in the 1980s to allow “any
member of the public” to maintain on behalf of a disadvantaged person or determinate class of
disadvantaged persons “an application for an appropriate direction, order or writ” in the Supreme Court
when “breach of any fundamental right of such person or class of person” is alleged and when, because of
their “disadvantaged” position, such persons are unable to approach the court for relief. M.C. Mehta v.
Union of India, A.I.R. 1987 S.C. 1086 ¶ 4 (citing S.P. Gupta v. Union of India, (1982) 2 S.C.R. 365, A.I.R.
1982 S.C. 149).
20. People’s Union for Civil Liberties v. Union of India & Ors. (S.C. 2001), Writ Petition (Civil) No.
196/2001, available at http://www.righttofoodindia.org/case/petition.html.
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a Saturday morning. In the space of two days we traveled by jeep to nine successively
remote villages. Within the group, I was the only woman and the only one who did not
speak either Hindi or Telugu. Some of the villagers had never seen a Caucasian, and
the mere sight of my face caused numerous children to hide in fear or giggle
uncontrollably.
The villages we visited were chosen as investigation sites because each was
reported to have experienced one or more recent starvation deaths. The reports proved
for the most part to be true. As we learned from the gentle but probing interviews with
the villagers conducted with the help of translators, the deceased were often elderly
women whose younger relatives had been forced to migrate in search of food and
work, leaving behind the mother, grandmother, aunt, or cousin who was too old and
weak to travel. Typically the victim, suffering from emotional as well as physical
deprivation, quickly became too weak to beg for food from neighbors (who themselves
had barely enough to eat) and died in isolation shortly after the departure of her family.
Not all who starved to death were elderly women, but most of the victims were in
similarly vulnerable situations. The “non-starving” villagers routinely reported that
they existed on an average of a handful of rice a day, eaten at the one daily meal.
The final site, which we reached by driving to the outer boundary of a tiger
preserve and hiking through trackless undergrowth after the jeep could go no further,
was home to a remote tribe, locally known as “forest people.” The tribe’s existence
is intertwined with the gum trees that rise in groves around the perimeter of their
village. They harvest gum and other forest-based materials, taking them to market in
a town a day’s walk away. Their wooden huts were simple but finely-crafted; a row
of tin shacks erected by the central government under a “village improvement”
program stood empty, a rusting eyesore. Through one of our translator-guides, the
tribal members recounted the devastating effects of the prolonged drought, the two
years in which there had been no teacher for the village school, and the futile efforts
to get the government to supply grain for the empty go-down. They explained that
whenever there was rice, they ate it with roots and tubers from the forest. When there
was no rice, they boiled the roots and tubers and added tree gum to the water. There
had been no rice for a long time.
As we moved from village to village, the information on hunger and starvation was
gathered systematically and meticulously in preparation for the legal proceedings. But
no one on the trip looked only with lawyers’ eyes. The local men who were our guides
were nearly all members of the People’s War party, a militant leftist group. Their lives
were spent in constant and often violent opposition to both the state and central
authorities, and they prescribed different remedies for the failures of government than
petitions to the Supreme Court. Still, they respected HRLN and its mission and treated
Colin Gonsalves as a colleague. They readily provided rare access and insight to life
in the remote villages with full appreciation of the end goal of our investigation.
Thanks to these anti-government guerillas and to the courageous villagers who
were willing to tell their stories to strangers and let their words be written down and
carried away on a legal pad, the next compliance hearing was riveting. Faced with
HRLN’s compelling evidence of starvation, death, and official inaction, the Court
issued its most strongly worded order on May 2, 2003, mandating increased food
allotments and observing that “[m]ere schemes for food are of no use. What is
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important is that the food must reach the hungry.”21 The Court for the first time
articulated a right to food and stated that it should be the highest priority for both the
government and the bench. The investigation led to new legal rights, and hopefully a
better food supply, for some of India’s poorest people. The rule of law was served by
putting the teeth of court enforcement into long-existing provisions, with the help from
some unlikely sources.
Watching from afar and witnessing on occasional visits India’s steady climb up
the ladder of relative prosperity in the four years since I served as an ISLP volunteer,
I have often reflected on my trip to the far reaches of Andhra Pradesh, and it remains
a vivid and paradoxical experience. On the one hand, the mission and lessons of the
trip were clear and, notwithstanding its fascinating terrain, even conventional. The
purpose was to collect compelling evidence that would persuade the judiciary to more
effectively remedy a legal wrong: starvation and hunger among the poor in violation
of the legal obligation of the government to address and prevent it. In this sense, the
mission and outcome were successful. On the other hand, the trip and its mission were
rooted in complex issues that cannot be reduced to a single legal wrong nor resolved
by a single remedy, regardless of how sweeping or effective. Starvation in India’s rural
villages, while exacerbated by drought and government indifference, is a symptom and
product of more than hunger. Regardless of India’s rising fortunes on the world stage,
as of 2005 nearly 840 million people lived on less than twenty Rupees, a half dollar a
day.22 About thirty percent of children in India receive no form of primary education.
Nearly 350 million people are illiterate and tens of millions lack access to drinking
water, decent sanitation, and basic medicines.23 The lowest caste members are still
shunned and mistreated, often relegated to living on the outskirts of villages and
forbidden to use common wells or obtain even the most menial jobs. The continuing
caste oppression spawns regular violent clashes between Dalits and government
authorities. While there is indisputably a burgeoning middle class and other salutary
“trickle down” effects from the new prosperity, especially in urban areas, on India’s
current trajectory it seems unlikely that the roar of the tiger economy will be heard by
the forest people of Andhra Pradesh or by most of the other millions of India’s poor
who live, figuratively and literally, off the track.
The keys to these disparities and extremes of life in present-day India may at first
blush seem to lie less in law or law reform and more in social and economic action.
Certainly public health initiatives, literacy programs, job training, more and better
schools, agricultural reforms, and other interventions by both the government and
private sectors must be increased and delivered effectively in a form that is culturally

21. People’s Union for Civil Liberties v. Union of India & Ors. (S.C. 2001), Writ Petition (Civil) No.
196/2001, Interim Order (May 2, 2003), available at http://www.righttofoodindia.org/orders/may203.html.
For an excellent description of the legal and political history and impact of the Right to Food case,
including the full text of the interim orders through 2005, see Right to Food Campaign, Supreme Court
Orders on the Right to Food: A Tool for Action (Oct. 2005), http://www.righttofoodindia.org/data/
scordersprimer.doc.
22. NATIONAL COMMISSION FOR ENTERPRISES IN THE UNORGANISED SECTOR, REPORT ON CONDITIONS
OF WORK AND PROMOTION OF LIVELIHOODS IN THE UNORGANISED SECTOR 1 (2007), available at
http://nceus.gov.in/Condition_of_workers_sep_2007.pdf. The number is likely significantly larger, since
the very poor are undercounted.
23. Id. at 1-13.
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compatible with the lives of the intended beneficiaries. However, as the work of public
interest and human rights lawyers like those at HRLN shows, the law does provide a
potent vehicle to attack social and economic inequities and create change at a fundamental level. Indeed, the United Nations, international development agencies, and
economists have recognized that the strength of the rule of law within a country
correlates strongly with the degree of shared growth and prosperity among its
population.24 In India, numerous sources of law already on the books are currently the
focus of PILs and other legal actions, and these could be even further expanded,
keeping judicial pressure on the state and central governments to enforce and
implement existing law.25 For example, the Constitution of India contains directives
on providing equitable education opportunities, minimizing income disparities,
providing for the welfare of children, and securing a social order built on social,
economic, and political justice.26 Enforcing existing laws in India may be a route to
social change on a larger scale than would be true in many nations in which the legal
constructs are not yet as well developed. Moreover, as both the Afzal and right to food
cases illustrate, educating people about legal rights may have an effect beyond formal
legal channels, building awareness and alliances among groups whose power to
effectuate change is magnified by their joint efforts both within and without the legal
system.
On a personal note, my volunteer experience—whatever small value it was to my
colleagues in New Delhi—was of immense value to me both personally and
professionally. I re-learned that it is a privilege to be a lawyer anywhere in the world.
I was reminded viscerally that the rule of law is never settled but is always perched on
a slippery slope, with lawyers as crucial determinants in whether the direction will be
forward or backward. Additionally, I witnessed the rule of law being tended and
advanced by those outside of the traditional legal system with great force and effect.
Perhaps the most important lesson was that the power of the shared belief in the rule
of law cannot be underestimated. As ISLP has recognized, there is a need and
opportunity for effort by lawyers everywhere in the world to help translate that power
into action.

24. See, e.g., Order in the Jungle: Economics and the Rule of Law, THE ECONOMIST (Mar. 13, 2008).
25. See Chief Justice Y.K. Sabharal, Inaugural Address in Golden Jubilee Regional Seminar of Indian
Law, Institute at Cuttack, Access to Justice: Role of Law in the Alleviation of Poverty and Deprivation
(Sept. 9, 2006), available at http://www.supremecourtofindia.nic.in/new_links/CUTTACK.pdf.
26. See generally INDIA CONST. Part III (Fundamental Rights) & Part IV (Directive Principles of State
Policy), available at http://lawmin.nic.in/coi.htm.

